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I. INTRODUCTION
The Connecticut General Assembly recently enacted significant
changes to the state's Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure.' This Note
explains why these amendments, which took effect on October 1, 2000, fail
to advance the statute's original purpose of increasing the amount of low-
and moderate-income housing throughout Connecticut. 2 The amendments,
while purporting to help low-income housing consumers, are likely to slow
considerably the construction of affordable housing in the state.
The Appeals Procedure was originally enacted to promote the
construction of housing for low- and moderate-income families by
providing developers an opportunity to obtain judicial review of towns'
denials of their applications to develop affordable housing. The law applied
both to nonprofit and public housing organizations and to private
developers. It allowed private developers to appeal denials as long they
placed restrictive covenants on twenty percent of the units in their
1. An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission To Study
Affordable Housing Regarding the Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure, 2000 Conn. Acts 206
(Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2001)).
2. The state's need for affordable housing continues to be substantial. A commission charged
with evaluating the state's need for affordable housing estimated that, as of 1997, there was "a
supply shortfall of 67,915 [housing] units [that would be affordable] for households [earning]
between 0-80% of' area median income. REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION TO STUDY
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 33 (2000) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT].
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development, creating so-called deed-restricted units.3 Since the procedure
was enacted more than a decade ago, private developers have constructed
by far the greatest number of housing units under the Appeals Procedure,
more than nonprofit or public-sector housing developers. Studies have
shown that not only the deed-restricted units that private developers have
constructed under the Appeals Procedure, but also the market-rate units
they have produced in the same developments, have provided cheaper
housing than previously was available in many towns.4
The 2000 amendments to the Appeals Procedure impose more stringent
requirements on private developers who want to bring appeals under the
statute. The amendments increase the percentage of units to which a
developer must attach restrictive covenants in order to qualify under the
statute. They also require the developer to restrict the affordable units to
even lower prices and for a longer period of years than before. Together,
these new restrictions will significantly increase the costs of private
development under the Appeals Procedure and slow the production of
affordable housing in the state. The amendments may even be an intentional
attempt to sabotage private developers, promoted by an alliance of affluent
suburban towns and nonprofit housing organizations, both of whom would
benefit from getting private developers out of the business of building
affordable housing. But whatever the legislature's motivation, the
amendments fail to further the goal of producing affordable housing
because they cripple private developers.
Even if nonprofit developers were able to fill all of Connecticut's needs
for low- and moderate-income housing by building deed-restricted units,
this would not be a good solution. Connecticut's experiment with deed-
restricted affordable units has been plagued with a variety of problems.
Because developers have shown that they can provide moderate-income
housing at market rates as long as they can build at reasonably high
densities, Connecticut should allow developers to trigger the Appeals
Procedure with proposals for medium- to high-density multifamily housing
developments. This procedure would build on the successes of the Appeals
Procedure while eliminating the problems created by deed-restricted
housing units.
Connecticut's experience with creating and administering affordable
housing units during the last decade is instructive for the many other states
that have actively experimented with legislative, administrative, and
judicial solutions to their own lack of affordable housing. These states'
3. The statute defines these as units in which the sale or rental price is restricted so that a
person earning no more than eighty percent of the state's or region's median income (whichever is
less) would spend no more than thirty percent of his or her yearly income on housing. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(6) (2001).
4. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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approaches have varied widely. Massachusetts and Rhode Island, for
example, have created administrative appeals processes by which
developers who apply to build deed-restricted affordable housing units may
appeal the denial of these applications to an administrative appeals board. 5
Other states have established agencies to oversee municipalities'
planning and zoning decisions. Following the Moint Laurel cases, 6 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state constitution
mandated that suburban towns permit the construction of their "fair share"
of the regional need for affordable housing, the state created the Council on
Affordable Housing (COAH), a statewide regulatory agency charged with
determining each municipality's "fair share" of affordable housing, and
with approving the municipalities' plans for affordable housing.
7
California, Florida, Oregon, and Washington all require municipalities to
submit comprehensive plans that include an affordable housing element in
which the municipality analyzes its current and future affordable housing
needs and proposes a way to meet those needs.
8
The judiciary has taken steps to deal with the problem of suburban
"exclusionary zoning"9 in other states such as New Hampshire,' New
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-4
(1999). Both acts apply only to public agencies, nonprofit organizations, or limited-equity or
limited-dividend organizations, and therefore do not extend to private for-profit developers.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 21 (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-4 (1999).
6. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983);
S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
7. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986). COAH's regulatory scheme
overlays the scheme of judicial challenges that municipalities face after the Mount Laurel cases. If
COAH certifies a municipality's "fair share plan," then that municipality is immune from Mount
Laurel challenges for a period of six years. Id. § 52:27D-313.
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65300, 65302 (West 1997) (requiring that all municipalities "adopt a
comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county or city" that
must include a "housing element"); FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3177(6)(f)(l)(d) (2000) (requiring that all
municipal comprehensive plans include a housing element that includes plans for the "provision
of adequate sites for... housing for low-income, very low-income, and moderate-income
families"); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.296 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.070 (West
1991). These oversight programs vary in strength based on what action the state agency in charge
may take if a municipality fails to comply with the "housing element" requirement. Compare FLA.
STAT. ch. 163.3184(1 l)(a) (2000) (allowing the statewide planning agency to withhold funding
from municipalities that fail to comply with the housing element requirement), and OR. REV.
STAT. § 197.335(4) (1999) (same), with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65585 (West 1997) (allowing the
statewide planning agency to advise municipalities that their plan does not comply with the
"housing element" requirement, but not giving the agency any power to require the towns to
change municipal plans).
9. Legal commentators have used the term "exclusionary zoning" to refer to various
municipal growth controls that slow development with the effect of excluding low-income
persons. E.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 781 (1969); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 390-402 (1977) (outlining
growth-control mechanisms that municipalities have employed and examining their economic
consequences).
10. Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991) (providing a builder's remedy
against a town that denied a permit to build multifamily housing).
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York, 11 Michigan,12 Pennsylvania, 13 and Virginia. 14 Basing their decisions
on the limits imposed by the state or federal constitution, 15 or by the state's
zoning enabling act, 16 these courts have invalidated suburban towns'
attempts to limit the growth of affordable housing. 17
Connecticut's approach is unique in that it has provided an effective
remedy for the denial of affordable housing applications in the state's
courts of general jurisdiction. 18 Connecticut's experience with the Appeals
Procedure during the last decade is instructive for other states not only
because it shows the benefits and drawbacks of administering an affordable
housing appeals procedure in the state's courts, but also because it
11. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975) (invalidating a municipal
zoning scheme that failed to allow any new multifamily residential developments).
12. E.g., Robinson Township v. Knoll, 302 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Mich. 1981) (holding that the
"per se exclusion of mobile homes... has no reasonable basis under the police power, and is
therefore unconstitutional").
13. E.g., Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977) (invalidating a township's
regulations because they prevented the township from allowing for the construction of its "fair
share" of multifamily housing); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466
(Pa. 1975) (relying on the "fair share" theory to provide a builder's remedy against a township
that zoned less than one percent of its area for multifamily housing); Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d
395 (Pa. 1970) (invalidating a municipal zoning scheme that did not provide for any multifamily
housing); Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965) (invalidating a zoning
ordinance that imposed a four-acre minimum lot size for the construction of new housing units).
14. Bd. of County Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396-97 (Va. 1959) (invalidating a
county zoning regulation that required larger minimum lot sizes in the western portion of the
county than in the eastern portion of the county as an unconstitutional exercise of the police
power).
15. E.g., Robinson Township, 302 N.W.2d at 149 (invalidating an ordinance because it had
"no reasonable basis under the police power"); Surrick, 382 A.2d at 110-11 (invalidating an
ordinance on substantive due process grounds); Carper, 107 S.E.2d at 395-96 (same).
16. E.g., Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 495-96 (N.H. 1991) (invalidating an
ordinance because it failed to take into account regional community interests as required by the
state's zoning enabling act).
17. There has been a notable tendency, however, for courts to cut back on their initial anti-
exclusionary decisions by creating exceptions. For example, the highest courts in both
Pennsylvania and New York have strictly limited the scope of their early opinions in this area.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has limited the "fair share" doctrine from Surrick by holding
that the "fair share" analysis applies only to communities that are "a logical area for growth and
development." Fernley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. 1985); see In re Appeal of
M.A. Kravitz Co., 460 A.2d 1075 (Pa. 1983). In BAC, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144
(Pa. 1993), Pennsylvania further limited the Surrick analysis to laws effecting "exclusions of
classes of people" as opposed to "restrictions on uses of property." Id. at 147.
The New York Court of Appeals limited Berenson by holding that challengers to local
zoning ordinances must demonstrate that the purpose of the ordinance was to exclude low- and
moderate-income housing and that such housing is not available in other towns in the general
region. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Upper Brookville, 414 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1980).
The court further limited Berenson in Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven,
511 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1987), in which the court rejected a developer's Berenson challenge on the
ground that the plaintiffs had failed to "demonstrate that efforts by the Town caused the claimed
shortage of shelter." Id. at 70.
18. While California provides an appeals procedure for affordable housing developers in the
state courts, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65589.5(h)(2) (West 1997), there has been very little activity
under this procedure because the courts have been reluctant to invalidate local decisions.
Ben Field, Why Our Fair Share Housing Laws Fail, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 35, 54 (1993).
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illustrates problems that are common to almost all statewide efforts to
promote the construction and fair-share distribution of low- and moderate-
income housing. These problems are linked to the deed-restriction devices
used by most of the states that have enacted legislative schemes designed to
promote affordable housing.
19
There is a debate in the economic and legal literature over the real
purpose and effect of "inclusionary zoning" 20 devices like the deed
restrictions relied upon by Connecticut's Appeals Procedure. Twenty years
ago, Professor Robert Ellickson wrote the seminal piece on inclusionary
zoning regulations, in which he argued that exclusionary municipalities
were really using these devices to limit growth. 2 1 Ellickson's view has been
widely adopted in the legal and economic literature.22 Fifteen years later,
Andrew Dietderich published an essay responding to Ellickson's critique,
which outlined a theory of how inclusionary zoning devices that rely on the
construction of deed-restricted units could benefit low- and moderate-
income housing consumers. 23 This Note contributes to this dialogue
by examining the problems that have arisen with the transfer and
administration of deed-restricted housing units in Connecticut during the
last decade.
This Note discusses several problems that have resulted from
Connecticut's heavy reliance on deed-restricted units in its Appeals
19. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65915 (West 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 20
(West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-4 (1999).
20. The term "inclusionary zoning" is used to describe regulations that either require
developers or provide incentives for developers to place price-restrictive covenants on a
percentage of units in a new housing development. E.g., William W. Merrill III & Robert K.
Lincoln, Linkage Fees and Fair Share Regulations: Law and Method, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT
FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE
IN THE DOL4N ERA 273,273 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995).
21. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167
(1981). Ellickson argues that inclusionary programs "are essentially taxes on the production of
new housing .... [that] will usually increase general housing prices, a result which further limits
the housing opportunities of moderate-income families." Id. at 1170. Thus, he concludes that
"most inclusionary ordinances are just another form of exclusionary practice." Id.
22. E.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 327-29 (1985); Quintin
Johnstone, Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major Program Analysis,
39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 373, 409-10 (1994); Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of
Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179, 181 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and
the New Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 588 n.49
(1990).
23. Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23 (1996). Dietderich analyzes three different inclusionary
zoning regimes: (1) a voluntary regime in which developers could negotiate to set aside a portion
of deed-restricted units in exchange for permission to build a denser development (a "density
bonus"); (2) a mandatory regime that would require developers to place deed restrictions on a
portion of all new units, but would compensate developers with a density bonus; and (3) a
mandatory regime that would require developers to create deed-restricted units, but would not
compensate them with a density bonus. Id. at 45-102. He concludes that given the right set of
underlying economic conditions, each regime has the potential to benefit low-income housing
consumers. See id. at 103.
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Procedure. These problems include: (1) that it is difficult for low- and
moderate-income home buyers to get mortgage financing for deed-
restricted units; (2) that it is difficult for state and local officials to monitor
the price and income limits on deed-restricted units and their occupants;
and (3) that deed restrictions may cause low- and moderate-income
homeowners to lose equity in their homes due to interest rate fluctuations.
These problems are likely to occur in all state and local affordable housing
programs that rely on the creation of deed-restricted housing units.
In this Note, I argue that a better alternative would be for Connecticut
to amend its Appeals Procedure so that developers could trigger it by
proposing to construct market-rate multifamily housing above a specified
density. This solution would not only avoid the problems associated with
deed-restricted units, but would also be likely to produce more moderate-
income housing by allowing developers to build multifamily housing at
higher densities than towns would normally permit. This proposal relies on
a longstanding literature that argues for the benefits of zoning
deregulation, 24 including that deregulation is likely to decrease housing
prices and lead to the creation of more low- and moderate-income
housing. 25 This Note outlines a concrete way to implement the ideas
proposed in this literature by arguing for a modest relaxation of the
restrictions on the construction of higher density multifamily housing (that
is, a partial zoning deregulation) within the structure of the Appeals
Procedure.
24. E.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); Robert C. Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI.
L. REV. 681 (1973) (arguing that private covenants and common-law rules could provide a more
effective substitute for zoning); Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719
(1980) (arguing that the advanced-planning approach to zoning should be rejected because it
cannot work in developing communities); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning Is the Best Zoning, 31
CAL. W. L. REV. 127 (1994) (arguing that zoning distorts market decisions and raises housing
prices).
25. E.g., JEROME ROTHENBERG ET AL., THE MAZE OF URBAN HOUSING MARKETS: THEORY,
EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 270 (1991) (noting that "various building and health codes and zoning
regulations make it either literally impossible or prohibitively expensive to build housing units of
qualities relevant to the demand of approximately the lower half of the income distribution");
Anthony Downs, Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 419, 420
(1992) (arguing that "[tihe biggest regulatory barriers to new lower cost housing are local zoning
regulations that restrict the construction of medium-density, walk-up, multifamily housing units");
Larson, supra note 22, at 182 (finding very low housing prices in the unregulated colonias on the
Texas-Mexico border); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71, 142-43
(1970) (noting in his study of Houston, the only major nonzoned city in America, that "[t]he most
measurable influence of zoning is its effect on multiple-family dwellings. If Houston had adopted
zoning in 1962, this would probably have resulted in higher rents and a lesser number and variety
of apartments and, in consequence, some tenants would have been priced out of the new
apartment market. Most adversely affected would be tenants of average incomes"); cf Paul
Boudreaux, An Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial Desegregation, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 533, 556-63 (1999) (arguing that permitting the construction of more multifamily
housing in predominantly white suburbs would foster racial integration).
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Part H of this Note provides a brief history of the original enactment of
the Appeals Procedure, a description of how Connecticut's courts have
implemented it, and estimates of the number of housing units that have
been created as a result of the Appeals Procedure. Part III describes the
problems that led the legislature to overhaul the statute in 2000. Part IV
discusses why the 2000 amendments are likely to slow the development of
affordable housing in Connecticut. Part V discusses the problems created
by the deed-restricted units on which the amended statute relies heavily.
Finally, Part VI proposes an alternative procedure that would allow
developers to appeal the denial of proposals for market-rate multifamily
housing developments above a certain density without having to create
deed-restricted units.
H1. THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING APPEALS PROCEDURE
In the late 1980s, Connecticut's legislators became concerned with
what many viewed to be an affordable-housing crisis in the state.26 The
problem was affecting not only very poor people, but also those with
moderate incomes, such as municipal employees, many of whom found
themselves priced out of the Connecticut towns in which they worked
during the buoyant 1980s real estate market.
27
The legislature convened a Blue Ribbon Commission in 1987 to study
the extent of the need for affordable housing and to propose ways to
address that need. By 1989, the Blue Ribbon Commission had produced
two reports with numerous recommendations for a legislative program to
address the state's affordable housing problem.28 The central, and certainly
the most enduring, piece of legislation to come from the 1987 Blue Ribbon
Commission was the Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Act, 29 which
became effective on July 1, 1990.
While the primary goal of the statute was to increase the construction of
low- and moderate-income housing in the state, it was probably also
motivated by the idea that suburban towns should provide a "fair share" of
26. E.g., Melinda Westbrook, Connecticut's New Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure:
Assaulting the Presumptive Validity of Land Use Decisions, 66 CONN. B.J. 169, 169 (1992)
(citing a 1988 state study that estimated that "among Connecticut's 169 municipalities, 169,000
households are in need of adequate shelter").
27. E.g., Jack Cavanaugh, Town Tries To Build Its Own Houses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1987,
§ 23, at I (describing that in the town of Wilton, where the average home price was $460,000,
municipal employees could not afford housing at their $30,000 salaries).
28. Westbrook, supra note 26, at 171.
29. An Act Establishing a State Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Procedure and
Concerning the Effect of Changes in Zoning or Inland Wetlands Regulations or Previously Filed
Applications § 1, 1989 Conn. Acts 311 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-30g (2001)). The statute is currently referred to as the "Affordable Housing Appeals
Procedure."
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the regional need for affordable housing. Both the 1969 Massachusetts
"anti-snob" zoning law,30 and New Jersey's Mount Laurel cases 31 and Fair
Housing Act of 198532 relied on the "fair share" model. These rules
provided models for the commission that drafted Connecticut's Appeals
Procedure statute. 33 The Massachusetts statute set up an administrative
appeals procedure that allows developers to challenge towns that prohibit
low-income housing, 34 while New Jersey's Fair Housing Act imposes
affirmative duties on municipalities to construct a fair share of the low-
income housing needed to satisfy regional needs.
The idea that benefits will accrue from the dispersal of low-income
housing also underlies these anti-exclusionary-zoning statutes. New
Jersey's first Mount Laurel decision, which required towns to permit the
construction of affordable housing, relied not only on the "fair share"
concept, but also on an idea of "spatial deconcentration," whereby "lower-
income persons would be dispersed throughout the state, resulting in socio-
economic integration [and] balanced communities." 35 Studies have shown
that concentrated poverty can have detrimental feedback effects on
poor communities, 36 especially in public housing developments. 3 7 The
commission that drafted the Connecticut legislation intended to use
dispersal of low-income housing to "address a panoply of social ills,"
including that "the lack of affordable housing contributes to de facto
segregation along the vectors of both race and ethnicity." 38
30. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West 1994).
31. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983);
S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986).
33. Terry J. Tondro, Fragments of Regionalism: State and Regional Planning in Connecticut
at Century's End, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1123, 1137-38 (1999) ("The [Blue Ribbon]
Commission... considered the existing models for encouraging the development of affordable
housing already developed by New Jersey and Massachusetts.").
34. See generally Paul K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing
One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535 (1992)
(describing the development and administration of the Massachusetts "anti-snob" zoning appeals
procedure).
35. Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning Law,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623,627 (1987).
36. E.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 167-76 (1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 137-44
(1987).
37. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 497, 507 (1993) ("[Hligh concentration of poverty... generates social problems ... both
different in kind and magnitude from the problems faced by poor people in less concentrated
settings."); Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and
Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1290-95 (1995).
38. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231, 255, 256
n.4 (Conn. 1999) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (citing the 1989 report from the Blue Ribbon
Commission that drafted the original Appeals Procedure).
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Connecticut's appeals statute uses a procedural approach to deal with
the "not in my back yard" phenomenon of municipalities resisting the
construction of low-cost housing. In cases reviewing the denial of
affordable housing proposals, the statute does this by shifting the burden to
the local zoning board to show that its decisions were valid.
39
A. Which Proposals May a Developer Appeal?
The Appeals Procedure allows developers to appeal from an adverse
decision40 by a municipal land use authority for two types of proposals.
First, the developer may appeal if he or she proposed to construct "assisted
housing," which the statute defines as "housing which is receiving, or will
receive, financial assistance under any governmental program for the
construction or substantial rehabilitation of low and moderate income
housing, and any housing occupied by persons receiving rental assistance"
under the federal Section Eight voucher program.41 Second, under the
statute as it existed before the 2000 amendments, a developer could appeal
the denial or constructive denial of a "set-aside development"
in which not less than twenty-five per cent of the dwelling units
will be conveyed by deeds containing covenants or restrictions
which shall require that such dwelling units shall be sold or rented
at, or below, prices which will preserve units as affordable
housing ... for persons and families whose income is less than or
equal to eighty per cent of the area median income, or eighty per
cent of the state median income, whichever is less, for at least thirty
years after the initial occupation of the proposed development.
42
39. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c) (1999). In this Part, I cite the 1999 Connecticut General
Statutes to describe the Appeals Procedure as it existed prior to the 2000 amendments. The 2000
amendments left intact many of the sections of the statute cited in this Part, but in some cases
reordered or renumbered them. When citing the 1999 code in this Part, I note where the language
of a section has been subsequently amended. For a full description of the changes made by the
2000 amendments, see infra Section III.B.
40. The statute allows developers to appeal "any application made.., in connection with an
affordable housing development" that was "denied or... approved with restrictions which have a
substantial adverse impact on the viability of the affordable housing development." Id. § 8-30g(a)-
(b).
41. Id. § 8-30g(a)(3).
42. Id. § 8-30g(a)(1)(B). Initially, the state set the minimum percentage of deed-restricted
units at twenty percent for at least twenty years. An Act Establishing a State Affordable Housing
Land Use Appeals Procedure and Concerning the Effect of Changes in Zoning or Inland Wetlands
Regulations or Previously Filed Applications § 1(a), 1989 Conn. Acts 311 (Reg. Sess.) (codified
as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2001)). In 1995, the legislature increased the
requirements for "set-aside" developments by increasing the share of deed-restricted units to
twenty-five percent and requiring that the units remain affordable for at least thirty years. The
1995 amendments also required that the price of these units be calculated based on eighty percent
of the area's or the state's median income, whichever is less. An Act Modifying the State
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The two categories of development proposals from which the Appeals
Procedure provides an avenue for appeal apply to two very different sets of
developers. The "assisted housing" appeals category serves mainly
nonprofit organizations and government agencies seeking permission to
build publicly funded housing. The "set-aside developments" category,
which has generated the majority of appeals brought under the statute,43
provides an incentive for private developers to fund the construction of
price-restricted affordable housing units.
This Note focuses mainly on the private side of the Appeals Procedure,
the appeals from proposals for set-aside developments. In addition to
generating most of the appeals under the statute, 44 the set-aside
developments category has also been the most controversial aspect of the
Appeals Procedure, creating numerous proposals for its repeal or
amendment. 45 The 2000 amendments to the statute focus largely on the set-
aside developments category. 46 Finally, this part of the Appeals Procedure
has a greater potential to generate the construction of affordable housing
units than the "assisted housing" category because it provides private
incentives to do so through an "implicit density bonus." 47 While the
Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Process § 1, 1995 Conn. Acts 280 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as
amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2001)). In 1999, the legislature again increased the
requirements for set-aside developments, requiring that at least ten percent of the units in a set-
aside development be affordable to people earning sixty percent or less of the area's or state's
median income, whichever is less. An Act Concerning Requirements Under the Affordable
Housing Appeals Procedure and Jurisdiction over Affordable Housing Appeals § 1, 1999 Conn.
Acts 261 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2001)).
43. Bill Ethier et al., Survey of Development of Affordable Housing in Connecticut and
Evaluation of Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Act, 1990-96, at 6 (Feb. 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Office of Legislative Research, Connecticut General Assembly) ("The
substantial majority of affordable housing developments proposed under the statute have been
pursued by applicants proceeding without governmental subsidies or assistance ...."); see also
infra Section II.D (providing the numbers of different types of housing units built under the
Appeals Procedure).
44. Ethier et al., supra note 43, at 6.
45. During the 1997, 1998, and 1999 sessions, legislators introduced twelve bills to amend
the part of the statute that addresses set-aside developments. JOHN RAPPA, OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, No. 99-R-0826, BILLS AFFECTING THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND
USE APPEALS PROCEDURE (1999), available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/rpllolr/99-r-
0826.doc.
46. An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission To Study
Affordable Housing Regarding the Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure § 1(a)(6), 2000 Conn.
Acts 206 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2001)).
47. The incentive that private developers have to include affordable units is that it will enable
them to construct housing developments at higher densities than would be permitted by the
existing zoning regulations. This is an advantage for developers because the value of land
generally increases as the allowable development density increases. E.g., Theodore M. Crone,
Elements of an Economic Justification for Municipal Zoning, 14 J. URB. ECON. 168, 170 (1983).
This "density bonus" is "implicit" because, unlike many programs that contain a schedule of
automatic density increases awarded for including different percentages of affordable housing in a
development, Ellickson, supra note 21, at 1180, Connecticut's program leaves it to the developers
to propose a development's design, with the maximum density limited only by reasonableness and
feasibility.
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"assisted units" portion of the Appeals Procedure seeks to open the way for
developments for which there is an independent source of public funds, the
set-aside developments provision actually provides incentives directly to
developers.
B. To Which Municipalities Does the Appeals Procedure Apply?
Certain towns are exempt from the Appeals Procedure. The procedure
does not apply to towns
in which at least ten per cent of all dwelling units in the
municipality are (1) assisted housing or (2) currently financed by
Connecticut Housing Finance Authority mortgages or (3) subject to
deeds containing covenants or restrictions which require that such
dwelling units be sold or rented at, or below, prices which will
preserve the units as affordable housing.., for persons and
families whose income is less than or equal to eighty per cent of the
area median income.48
The state's Commissioner of Economic and Community Development
maintains a list of towns that are exempt from the Appeals Procedure. As of
April 2000, thirty of Connecticut's municipalities were exempt from the
Appeals Procedure.49 The remaining 139 towns did not qualify for the
exemption. 50
C. Review Procedure
Under the Appeals Procedure, developers may appeal in the
Connecticut courts the denial of any affordable housing application. The
biggest change that the Appeals Procedure made to the state's procedure for
reviewing local zoning decisions is that it placed the burden of proving the
validity of the decision on the local zoning board itself.
In traditional zoning appeals, courts apply a highly deferential standard
when reviewing the decisions of municipal land use authorities.
Traditionally, in order to reverse a municipal land use commission's quasi-
legislative decision, such as a ruling on an application for a change in the
zoning map, courts have required that the applicant demonstrate "that
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(f) (1999). The procedure for calculating which towns are
exempt from the statute was changed slightly by the 2000 amendments. For a description of these
changes, see infra Subsection III.B.4.
49. Memorandum from Thomas J. Ciccalone, Executive Director, Public Affairs and
Strategic Planning Division, Connecticut Department of Economic and Community Development
(Apr. 11, 2000), http://www.state.ct.us/ecd/Housing/appeals.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2001)
[hereinafter Ciccalone Memorandum].
50. Id. at 7-8.
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the commission has acted 'arbitrarily[,] illegally ... or in abuse of
discretion.' 51 The standard for reversing a commission's administrative
decision, such as reviewing a special permit application, is lower, requiring
that the applicant show that the commission's decision was not supported
by "'substantial' evidence in [the] record."'52 The courts treat both types of
decisions as being presumptively valid; it is the applicant's burden to show
that they are not.53
The Appeals Procedure provides specific instructions for courts
reviewing the denial of applications that qualify under the statute. The
statute shifts the burden of proof to the municipal land use authority to
show that:
(A) the decision from which such appeal is taken and the reasons
cited for such decision are supported by sufficient evidence in the
record; (B) the decision is necessary to protect substantial public
interests in health, safety, or other matters which the commission
may legally consider; (C) such public interests clearly outweigh the
need for affordable housing; and (D) such public interests cannot
be protected by reasonable changes to the affordable housing
development .... 54
1. Supported by Sufficient Evidence in the Record
The first prong of the review procedure requires zoning commissions to
demonstrate that the reasons that they cited for denying the application
were supported by "sufficient evidence in the record. '55 The Connecticut
Supreme Court has defined sufficient evidence as "less than a
preponderance of the evidence, but more than a mere possibility."56 In
other words, "the zoning commission need not establish that the effects it
sought to avoid by denying the application 'are definite or more likely than
not' to occur, but that such evidence must establish more than a 'mere
possibility' of such occurrence."57
51. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n, 653 A.2d 798, 814 (Conn. 1995) (citation omitted).
52. Id. (citation omitted). But see Westbrook, supra note 26, at 177-78 (arguing that
"Connecticut courts have not, in practice, sharply distinguished these standards").
53. Blue Sky Bar, Inc. v. Town of Stratford, 523 A.2d 467, 473 (Conn. 1987) (stating that
"[t]he party challenging the enactment bears the burden of overcoming th[e] presumption" of the
local commission's rationality); Kovacs v. City of Meriden, No. CV90-0235455, 1993 WL
137750, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 1993).
54. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c)(1) (1999). The standard of review under this section was
changed by the 2000 amendments. For a description of this change, see infra Subsection III.B.2.
55. Id. § 8-30g(c)(l)(A).
56. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231, 243 (Conn.
1999).
57. Id. (citation omitted).
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This prong creates two requirements. First, the court will examine only
the commission's stated reasons for rejecting the affordable housing
application.58 Second, the reasons must have at least some (that is,
"sufficient") support in the record. In spite of this seemingly deferential
standard of evidence, courts have often reversed commissions for a failure
to state reasons that are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.
59
2. Necessary To Protect Substantial Public Interests
The second prong of the review procedure requires zoning boards to
demonstrate that their decision is "necessary to protect substantial public
interests in health, safety, or other matters which the commission may
legally consider." 60 Interests that the courts have found to be substantial
and legally permissible under this prong include insufficient water
reserves,61 threats of contamination to the town's water supply,62 inability
to provide safe sewage disposal, 63 threats to the preservation of open
space,64 and excessive building density or building height.65 The courts
have been particularly likely to find that an interest qualifies as a
"substantial public interest" if there is additional evidence that it is not
58. Id. at 238 (holding that a town must make "'a formal, official, collective statement of
reasons for its actions' (citation omitted)).
59. E.g., Charles E. Williams, Inc. v. New Milford Planning Comm'n, No. CV 9804922285,
2000 WL 775643, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 26, 2000); Thompson v. Zoning Comm'n, No.
CV 990494184, 2000 WL 73519, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2000) (finding no
"quantifiable probability of harm to any public interest").
60. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c)(1)(B) (1999).
61. Carr v. Bridgewater Planning & Zoning, No. 980442227, 1999 WL 391584, at *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 4, 1999) (finding that the lack of a potable water supply outweighed the need for
affordable housing); Christian Activities Council v. Town Council, No. 541990, 1996 WL
532485, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1996) (finding that the threat to a potential future water
supply was a legitimate public interest that outweighed the need for affordable housing), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d
231 (Conn. 1999); Greene v. Ridgefield Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 90-04421315, 1993
WL 7560, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1993) (finding that a concern that town water could not
be provided to a new development without obtaining an additional water source was a substantial
public interest that the commission could consider).
62. Carr, 1999 WL 391584, at *7-8 (finding testimony that a septic system would likely
contaminate the town's water supply to raise a substantial public interest); Fairfield 2000 Homes
Corp. v. Town of Newtown Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV9705787565, 1999 WL 186768,
at *8 (Conn. Super Ct. Mar. 22, 1999) (same).
63. Nucera v. Zoning Comm'n of Stratford, No. CV 970565039, 1998 WL 470587, at *15
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1998) (stating that the commission could consider the capacity of the
sewer system); D'Amato v. Orange Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 92-05064265, 1993 WL
45042, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1993) (same).
64. Christian Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 251-54; see also Dime Say. Bank v. Durham
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 94-0536676, 1995 WL 548755, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 12, 1995) (holding that preserving land for commercial and industrial development could
outweigh the need for affordable housing if the site's conditions were favorable for commercial or
industrial development).
65. Nucera, 1998 WL 470587, at *13-15 (finding that the commission could permissibly
consider building density and heights).
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merely pretextual, such as historical documentation that the town intended
to preserve the land for a particular use. 6
6
Interests that courts have found are not "substantial public interests" for
the purposes of the statute include the fiscal impact on the municipality's
school system,67 a town's desire to adhere completely to its prior zoning
regulations (including preexisting local affordable housing regulations)16 8
and negative effects on the value of neighboring properties. 69
3. Public Interests Clearly Outweigh the Need for Affordable Housing
The third prong of the review procedure requires zoning commissions
to demonstrate that sufficient evidence existed in the record for the
commission reasonably to have determined that the public interests cited
"clearly outweigh" the need for affordable housing.70 With respect to this
element of the test, courts have focused mainly on how towns are to define
their need for affordable housing. For much of the life of the statute, courts
have defined need as a regional or statewide need. Some courts held that the
66. Christian Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 251-54 (affirming on the ground that the town
had a legitimate public interest in preserving the parcel as open space in light of the repeated
expression of that interest since 1971); United Progress, Inc. v. Borough of Stonington Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 92-05133925, 1994 WL 76803, at *18-19 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4,
1994) (finding valid the town's expressed desire to preserve a site for industrial uses due to the
fact that the site had been used for industry since the mid-I 800s).
67. Barberino Realty & Dev. Corp. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 93 05268415,
1994 WL 547537, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1994) ("Neither sections 8-2 or 8-30g
expressly or impliedly permit a rejection of an affordable housing application premised on the
impact of additional students on the school system."); Pratt's Comer P'ship v. Southington
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV92 05088775, 1993 WL 229752, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 21, 1993) (rejecting the commission's reliance on the burdens of the development on the
local education system); TCR New Canaan Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 384353,
1992 WL 48587, at *25 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 1992) ("It has long been clear that zoning
policy may not be based on fiscal considerations such as whether a particular residential
development will result in added [educational] costs to the town."). But cf Dime Sav. Bank, 1995
WL 548755, at *6-7 (finding that preserving land for commercial and industrial development for
fiscal reasons may be permissible).
68. Town Close Assocs. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 679 A.2d 378, 381 n.8 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1996) (holding that the commission's desire not to depart from its existing affordable housing
regulations was not a substantial public interest for the purposes of the statute); Wisniowski v.
Planning Comm'n, 655 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) ("[The plain and unambiguous
language of § 8-30g does not contemplate a denial of an affordable housing subdivision
application on the ground that it does not comply with the underlying zoning of an area.").
69. Vineyard Constr. Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Trumbull, No. 0492251, 1999 WL 566967, at
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 23, 1999) (holding that concerns over neighbors' property values were
not a substantial public interest); Pratt's Comer P'ship, 1993 WL 229752, at *6 ("Under § 8-30g
the significance of protecting property values as a substantial public interest falls to a lower level
in the hierarchy of importance."). But cf Griswold Hills Newington Ltd. v. Newington Town
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 940540954S, 1996 WL 24569, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
6, 1996) ("[A] zoning authority may have a legitimate public interest in protecting property
values.").
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c)(1)(C) (1999).
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need was defined by the exemption provisions in the statute itself.71
Therefore, if a town lacked an exemption from section 8-30g, then courts
presumed the town had a substantial need for affordable housing. Others
held more generally that the Act contemplated "need" as the municipality's
fair share of the regional or state-wide need for low- and moderate-income
housing.72 The Connecticut Supreme Court in Christian Activities Council,
however, determined that "the need for affordable housing is to be
addressed on a local basis." 7 3 This decision functionally overruled the
standard that lower courts were implementing, and narrowed the
applicability of the Appeals Procedure. It was probably one of the main
factors motivating the legislature to appoint a second Blue Ribbon
Commission in 1999.
74
4. Public Interests Cannot Be Protected by Reasonable Changes
The fourth prong of the review procedure requires local commissions to
show that the public interests that they cite as grounds for refusing the
application "cannot be protected by reasonable changes to the affordable
housing development."'75 This section serves the dual purposes of
encouraging local land use boards to negotiate with applicants and
discouraging the boards from "loopholing" by objecting on grounds that are
valid, but that could be cured with reasonable changes to the project. Courts
have applied this prong by distinguishing between features in an application
that are plan-specific (which could be changed while remaining at the
71. Griswold Hills Newington Ltd., 1996 WL 24569, at *7 (holding that the zoning board had
no "right to disagree with the Department of Housing's designation of [the town] as a non exempt
community"); see also W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition v. Town Council, 636 A.2d 1342, 1354
n.23 (Conn. 1994) (stating that the fact that the town's percentage of housing that
qualified as affordable "falls far below the 10 percent figure needed.., to qualify under
the ... exemption ... [provides] sufficient evidence of local need").
72. Kaufman v. City of Danbury Zoning Comm'n, No. CV92 0507929 S, 1993 WL 316792,
at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1993) (noting that "[t]he legislature was very careful in writing
the statute not to restrict the scope of the need for affordable housing only to the municipality");
Pratt's Corner P'ship, 1993 WL 229752, at *2 ("The General Statutes are replete with forceful
legislative expressions of the long standing statewide need for affordable housing ... ").
73. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231, 249 (Conn.
1999). Christian Activities Council involved an appeal brought by the Christian Activities
Council, Congregational (CACC), an organization that sought to construct single-family low- and
moderate-income housing in the town of Glastonbury. Id. at 236. CACC contracted with a public
water company to purchase 33.42 acres of vacant land, but conditioned the contract on CACC's
ability to get a zone change and approval for the construction of at least twenty-six affordable
housing units. Id. Glastonbury's town council refused to rezone the parcel of land and CACC
appealed the decision to the superior court, which dismissed the appeal, and eventually to the
Connecticut Supreme Court. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the superior court, and
in the process narrowed the standard of review and scope of the definition of "need for affordable
housing" under the statute. See infra Subsection III.A.2. See generally Tondro, supra note 33, at
1143-46 (discussing the background and likely effects of Christian Activities Council).
74. BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 28, 60.
75. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (c)(l)(D) (1999).
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proposed site) and features that are site-specific (which could not be altered
given the existing site). If a court finds that an objectionable feature is site-
specific, it is much more likely to find in favor of the zoning board than if it
finds that the feature is plan-specific. 76
D. Outcomes
The clearest way to measure the Appeals Procedure's success in
increasing the number of lower-cost housing units across the state is to
measure the number of existing units that would not have been produced
had the Appeals Procedure not been in place. The few attempts to quantify
the results of the Appeals Procedure in this way have suffered from
different shortcomings, but they provide an idea of the number of units that
have been constructed as a result of the Appeals Procedure.
In 1996, several members of the original Blue Ribbon Commission
attempted to count the number of housing units produced under the statute.
This group surveyed planners and regional and local officials in all
of the towns in the state that were not exempt from the Appeals
Procedure as of 1996 to try to calculate the overall number of affordable
units created between 1990 and 1996 in two different categories:
"(1) developments proposed and constructed... through local cooperation
or settlement,. .. and (2) developments whose zoning approval was
litigated and the result of a court order."'77
The study concluded that, between 1990 and 1996, "at least 1,041
affordable housing units [were] approved without resort to the statute or by
local negotiation and settlement, and at least another 586 units have
received some form of zoning approval through litigation under the Act.",78
These numbers include only those units that would qualify as "affordable"
under the statute, that is, government-funded or deed-restricted units. The
study also found that 833 market-rate units had been built as part of
developments that contained deed-restricted units,79 and that 541 more
market-rate units had been approved by a court but had not yet been built.
76. Compare, e.g., Christian Activities Council v. Town Council, No. 541990, 1996 WL532485, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1996) (finding "that loss of potential public water
supply is... a site-specific issue" and upholding the zoning commission's decision), with T & NAssocs. v. New Milford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 980492236S, 1999 WL 1077588,
at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1999) (holding that the commission's concerns about drainage
and sewerage were plan-specific and finding in favor of the developer). See generally Christian
Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 262 (Berdon, J., dissenting) ("Plan-specific problems may be
eliminated by 'requiring reasonable design modifications' [but] [s]ite-specific problems, in
contrast, can only be avoided by denying the application." (citation omitted)).
77. Ethier et a., supra note 43, at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Of these 833 units, 523 resulted from negotiated approvals from zoning boards and 310
resulted from court-ordered approvals. Id. at 9-12.
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The study also concluded that these market-rate units "although.. . not
priced low enough to qualify as affordable housing units under the statute,
are less expensive than much of the other housing product available in the
host community."80
Connecticut's Office of Legislative Research updated this report during
the summer of 2000 by following up on all reported cases brought under
section 8-30g to determine the number of affordable units constructed after
court-ordered approvals under the statute. The study concluded:
Since 1990, the courts have ruled favorably for the developer
with respect to 27 projects that were appealed under the
procedure.... Developers have completed seven of these,
accounting for 666 units, 218 of which are affordable .... Five
projects are under construction (299 total units, 166 affordable), 12
are on the drawing boards (842 total units, 275 affordable), and
three have been canceled. 81
These numbers do not include estimates of housing units (deed-restricted or
otherwise) that were negotiated and approved out of court.
These studies demonstrate two important phenomena. First, around
two-thirds of the affordable housing units approved during the period from
1990 to 1996 were approved without the developer going to court. Second,
market-rate units constituted a substantial majority of the units developed in
connection with the Appeals Procedure during this period, and many of
these units provided less expensive forms of housing than had previously
existed without resorting to public funding or deed restrictions. 82 This may
result from the fact that many private developers have used the statute as a
wedge to get approvals for dense multifamily developments, which
generally sell at lower per-unit prices than large-lot single-family units.
These findings are significant because they show that, when allowed to
build at higher densities, developers can and will construct housing that is
less expensive than the housing available in the surrounding community.
They also show that section 8-30g seems to be changing the behavior of
local zoning commissions without developers always having to go to court.
Together, these findings suggest that section 8-30g could provide a
framework for relaxing the large-lot and single-family zoning requirements
80. Id. at 5. Timothy Hollister, a Hartford land use attorney and member of the 1999 Blue
Ribbon Commission, also confirmed that he had observed this phenomenon of the market-rate
units developed under the Appeals Procedure being less expensive than the housing in the host
town. Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister, Partner, Shipman & Goodwin, Hartford,
Conn. (Dec. 1, 2000).
81. JOHN RAPPA, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, NO. 2000-r-0607, HOUSING PROJECTS
DEVELOPED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND USE APPEALS PROCEDURE 8 (2000),
available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2000/rpt/olr/htm2000-r-0 6 07 .htm.
82. See discussion infra Section VI.A.
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imposed by exclusionary municipalities, thereby providing a source of new
moderate-income housing without having to use deed restrictions.
II. THE SECOND BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION AND THE 2000 AMENDMENTS
Almost as soon as the legislature enacted the Appeals Procedure, there
were numerous calls for its repeal or amendment. This Part discusses the
events that led to the creation of a new Blue Ribbon Commission in 1999,
including the dissatisfaction of planning and zoning officials and the
Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Christian Activities Council. It
then examines the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission
Report and the resulting changes that the legislature made to the statute.
A. Seeds of Discontent
1. Municipal Planning Officials
Professional planners in several Connecticut towns have expressed
continuing dissatisfaction with the Appeals Procedure. My interviews with
planning officials revealed that planners' concerns center around two
issues.8 3 They expressed concerns that (1) the procedure acts as a "zone
busting" device that gives developers unwarranted windfall profits and
allows them to exercise too much leverage over local zoning boards; and
R3_ I atternnted tn rnntnet nlnnnin, nffirink frnm il nf the mnniPcnnitiP, thnt nrp. liot-1 h
the Connecticut Department of Economic Development (DECD) as having deed-restricted units. I
interviewed municipal officials from Bridgeport, Cheshire, East Windsor, Fairfield, Farmington,
Glastonbury, Madison, Manchester, Milford, New Haven, Newtown, Norwalk, Plainville,
Shelton, Stamford, Vernon, West Hartford, Westbrook, and Wilton.
I selected the set of planners to interview from the DECD's 2000 list that catalogues the
amount of affordable housing in each Connecticut municipality. Ciccalone Memorandum, supra
note 49. The DECD keeps statistics on the housing stocks in each of Connecticut's 169 towns,
including the number of affordable deed-restricted units that exist in each community. I chose to
interview officials from the thirty-two towns that were listed by the DECD as having deed-
restricted housing units. I chose this set because the officials in the towns were the people most
likely to have experience both with monitoring and administering deed-restricted units (because
these are the towns that actually contain such units), and with working within the structure of the
Appeals Procedure (because it seemed likely that the units were created pursuant to the statute).
I contacted planning officials from all thirty-two of the towns in this set. Of these thirty-two,
nineteen were willing to do interviews. Some of the remaining thirteen, while unable to do
interviews, sent me information, including their towns' inclusionary zoning ordinances, which I
discuss in Section V.A.
While any interview data are vulnerable to the biases of the interview subjects, this sample is
relatively balanced because it contains officials both from towns that are exempt from the Appeals
Procedure (such as Bridgeport, Stamford, and New Haven, which contain much public and deed-
restricted affordable housing), and from those that are not exempt from the Appeals Procedure
(such as Madison and Wilton, which contain very little affordable housing). Statutes that attempt
to distribute a "fair share" of affordable housing throughout a region or state naturally pit the




(2) the exemption calculation is unfair because it does not count ordinary
low-priced housing units unless they are deed-restricted or publicly funded.
A 1996 survey of town and city planners in the Hartford region found that
the members of that group expressed similar concerns.
84
The Appeals Procedure gives developers an extra bargaining chip in
their negotiations with municipal land use boards by allowing them to
threaten to invoke the procedure by including deed-restricted units in their
proposal. Not surprisingly, municipal planning officials and the boards they
work with do not like this partial loss of negotiating power.
Milford's Assistant City Planner expressed frustration at the amount of
leverage that developers have under the Appeals Procedure to prescribe the
density and location of their development. He said that, under the statute,
the developer gets to choose the density bonus to award to himself.
85
Newtown's Director of Community Development said that the statute takes
away towns' ability to regulate the pace of their development and places it
in the hands of developers. 8
6
Several planners also expressed concerns that the procedures used to
calculate which towns are exempt from the statute are unfair. Some said
that the exemption calculation is confusing for municipalities and difficult
for the state to administer accurately. 87 Several others said that the
exemption calculation is flawed because it fails to count low-cost units that
would meet the price requirements for "affordable housing" but do not meet
the statute's deed restriction or public funding requirements. 88
84. Peter J. Vodola, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure Law in Practice,
29 CONN. L. REv. 1235, 1264-75 (1997); see also Tondro, supra note 33, at 1140 (stating that
"[p]lanners were among the Appeals Act's most outspoken critics").
85. Telephone Interview with Peter Crabtree, Assistant City Planner, Milford, Conn. (Nov.
22, 2000). Many "inclusionary zoning" regulations contain a graduated density-bonus schedule.
Ellickson, supra note 21, at 1180. In contrast, section 8-30g allows developers to propose
developments at whatever density they want as long as their proposal includes a set-aside of
twenty-five percent (now thirty percent) deed-restricted units. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2001).
86. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Stocker, Director of Community Development,
Newtown, Conn. (Nov. 21, 2000).
87. Telephone Interview with Peter Crabtree, supra note 85 (saying that he feels sorry for the
person who has to do the exemption calculations for section 8-30g); Telephone Interview with
Dorothy Wilson, City Planner, Norwalk, Conn. (Nov. 16, 2000) (stating that the exemption
calculation is difficult to understand and that the DECD has made several mistakes calculating
Norwalk's exemption).
88. Telephone Interview with Don Foster, Town Planner, West Hartford, Conn. (Nov. 16,
2000) (stating that West Hartford has "a very high inventory of units that meet the affordable
pricing criteria" but are not counted because they are not deed-restricted); Telephone Interview
with Ken Leslie, Town Planner, Glastonbury, Conn. (Oct. 27, 2000) ("We approved a condo
project about three years ago where the initial sales price was $80,000. We were offering single-
family condo units at prices below what qualified as 'affordable.' We did more for affordable
housing from '96 to '98 in condo sales than we did in the prior ten years [in government-funded
and deed-restricted units]."); Telephone Interview with Rick Schultz, Town Planner, Shelton,
Conn. (Oct. 26, 2000) ("Shelton has three trailer parks with units that average at $80,000 each. All
of our trailer parks, because they are not deed-restricted, do not get counted toward the total.");
see also Vodola, supra note 84, at 1268 (stating that some planners he interviewed "noted that it
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Legislators have expressed this local dissatisfaction with the Appeals
Procedure by introducing numerous bills to amend or repeal the statute.
Legislators introduced sixty-three of these bills during the 1997, 1998, and
1999 sessions.89 The vast majority of these bills would have weakened
private developers' ability to build housing under the statute by (1)
increasing the requirements for "set-aside" developments; 90 (2) easing the
standards by which towns could become exempt from the procedure;9 1 or
(3) altering the burden of proof to benefit local zoning commissions.92
2. The Connecticut Supreme Court's Ruling in Christian Activities
Council
The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Christian Activities
Council, Congregational v. Town Council9 3 was the event that directly
prompted the legislature to charge a second Blue Ribbon Commission with
overhauling the Appeals Procedure. 94  Christian Activities Council
interpreted two different provisions in the statute in ways that some claimed
would render the Appeals Procedure completely ineffective. 95
First, the court determined that a municipality's "need for affordable
housing," 96 which a reviewing court must balance against a commission's
reasons for denying an application, "is to be addressed on a local basis" '97
rather than as a portion of the regional or statewide need. As Justice Berdon
pointed out in dissent, the majority's interpretation of "need" seemed
to undermine the overall purpose of the statute. He argued "that a
local focus.., would threaten the development of affordable housing in
did not make sense for a law that relied upon private sector solutions to the affordable housing
problem to define affordable housing as only those units that were subsidized by the public sector
or, essentially, taken out of the market through deed restrictions").
89. RAPPA, supra note 45, at 1.
90. Id. at 5-6. This category of proposed bills illustrates a fundamental defect embedded in
the Appeals Procedure. Because the Appeals Procedure functions largely by imposing
requirements on private developers, legislators may undermine the statute by increasing these
requirements while at the same time sanctimoniously stating that they are making a greater
commitment to low-income housing needs.
91. Id. at4.
92. Several of these bills proposed to shift the burden of proof from towns to developers,
essentially making affordable housing appeals the same as appeals from all other zoning
decisions. Id. at 7-8.
93. 735 A.2d 231 (Conn. 1999).
94. BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 28, 60.
95. E.g., Christian Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 255 (Berdon, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's ruling cripples the affordable housing statute); Tondro, supra note 33, at 1142(stating that Christian Activities Council "dealt perhaps a mortal blow to the Affordable Housing
Appeals Act's effort to employ a means for spreading affordable housing throughout a region").
96. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (c)(1)(C) (1999).
97. Christian Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 249.
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wealthier towns. Because they have few low income residents, such towns
could claim that they have no (local) need for affordable housing."98
Second, the court decreased the level of review that the lower courts
had effectively been applying to cases brought under the Appeals
Procedure. The court found that the "sufficient evidence" standard stated in
section 8-30g(c)(1)(A) should also apply to sections 8-30g(c)(1)(B), (C),
and (D).99 The court held that its task in reviewing whether a zoning
commission carried its burden under section 8-30g(c) "is not to weigh the
evidence itself[, but] rather... to review the evidence and determine
whether... there was sufficient evidence for the commission reasonably to
have concluded" 100 that each element was fulfilled.
While it is not always clear what standard of review the lower courts
have been applying under the Appeals Procedure, the rule announced in
Christian Activities Council lowered it to somewhere close to the "abuse of
discretion" standard traditionally applied to appeals from legislative
decisions of local land use authorities. 10 1 It was for this reason that Justice
Berdon predicted that the majority's ruling on this standard of review
would "rip[] the soul out of affordable housing in the state of
Connecticut." 1
02
B. The Second Blue Ribbon Commission and Public Act 00-206
Faced with mounting dissatisfaction and uncertainty about the future
of the Appeals Procedure following Christian Activities Council, the
legislature created a second Blue Ribbon Commission in 1999, which it
charged with researching the state of affordable housing in Connecticut and
with recommending specific revisions to the Appeals Procedure. 103
Drawing on the many amendments proposed during the preceding years
and on the changes made by Christian Activities Council, the Blue Ribbon
Commission recommended changes to the Appeals Procedure in four main
areas. 104 The legislature enacted these recommendations with only a few
exceptions.
98. Id. at 261-62 (citing W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 636 A.2d
1342, 1349 (Conn. 1994)).
99. Id. at 245.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 242-43.
102. Id. at 255 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
103. An Act Establishing a Blue Ribbon Commission To Study Affordable Housing, 1999
Conn. Acts 15 (Reg. Sess.).
104. The 2000 Report also proposed several other changes to the state's affordable housing
policy, including creating several financial incentives for municipalities to construct affordable
housing. BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 14-17. I discuss only the changes
the report recommended to the Appeals Procedure.
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1. Reversing Christian Activities Council
The Commission recommended that the legislature should reverse both
of the major holdings of Christian Activities Council. It proposed for the
legislature to specify that the need to which section 8-30g(c) referred "is a
regional need, not a local or statewide need" 10 5 by inserting the word
"regional" before "need." It also proposed to heighten the level of review
by requiring a court to "determine, as a matter of law, whether the
commission has met the last three elements of CGS § 8-30g(c)(1) regarding
the burden of proof."1o
6
The legislature implemented the Commission's recommendation that
the statute specify that the court is to conduct its own review of the record
to determine whether a zoning board's decisions met the standards laid out
in sections 8-30g(c)(1)(B), (C), and (D). 107
The House of Representatives, however, chose not to reverse Christian
Activities Council's interpretation that the "need" to which section 8-30g(c)
referred should be interpreted as "local need." Instead, explained
Representative Flaherty, "the amendment leaves to judicial construction
what constitutes housing need." 10 8
2. Increasing the Requirementsfbr Set-Aside Developments
The report recommended that the legislature increase the requirements
for deed-restricted units in set-aside developments in three ways. First, the
Commission proposed to increase the minimum percentage of deed-
restricted units in a qualifying application from twenty-five percent to thirty
percent.' 0 9 Second, the Commission proposed to increase the percentage of
units that must be priced at or below rates that are "affordable" for tenants
or owners earning less than or equal to sixty percent of the lesser of the
region's or the state's median income. 1 0 The existing law required that ten
percent of the total units be restricted to this price level; the Commission
recommended increasing this to fifteen percent."1 ' Third, the Commission
105. Id. at 10.
106. Id. at 12.
107. The legislative history indicates that the legislators were not very clear on what standard
they want the courts to employ, but intimated that they would like to return to the situation before
Christian Activities Council when "sometimes towns ... prevailed and sometimes towns ... lost."
Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Hous., 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2000)
(statement of Robin Pearson, Co-Chair of the 2000 Blue Ribbon Commission).
108. Connecticut House of Representatives (transcript of Apr. 28, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Flaherty), available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2000/tmH/2000HTR00428-ROO-TRN.htm
[hereinafter "House Debate"]. For a discussion of the House's deliberations on this issue, see infra
Section IV.B.
109. BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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proposed to increase from "at least 30 years to at least 50 years from initial
occupancy the period during which... affordable units in a set-aside
development must be subject to maximum rental or sales price
restrictions." 112 The legislature enacted all of these recommendations,
except that it extended the minimum time limit for deed restrictions to forty
years instead of the recommended fifty.
113
3. Developer Submission Requirements
The legislature enacted the Commission's proposal to give local zoning
boards the power to require the proponent of an affordable housing
development to submit a conceptual site plan detailing the design of the
proposed development. 114 The legislature also adopted an amendment
requiring applicants to submit an "Affordability Plan" requiring applicants
to "designat[e] ... a person, agency, or entity responsible for administering
the plan, including complying with income limits and sale or rental
restrictions" and to submit plans for the marketing, initial sale and resale of
deed-restricted units. 115
4. Changing the Standards for Exemptions and Moratoria
The Commission recommended that the Appeals Procedure be
amended to require the state to use the number of housing units listed in the
last decennial U.S. Census as the denominator for calculating the town's
percentage of affordable units when determining which towns are exempt
from the Appeals Procedure. The Commission also recommended that the
legislature establish a way for towns to earn a three-year moratorium from
the statute based on a weighted point system (that is, lower-priced deed-
restricted units get more points).1 16 The legislature enacted both of these
recommendations. 117
IV. POTENTIAL PITFALLS IN THE 2000 AMENDMENTS
The 2000 amendments to the Appeals Procedure fail from a policy
perspective because they decrease the likelihood that dense multifamily
112. Id. at 11.
113. An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission To Study
Affordable Housing Regarding the Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure § l(a)(6), 2000 Conn.
Acts 206 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2001)).
114. Id. § 1(c).
115. Id. § l(b)(1).
116. BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 13.
117. An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission To Study
Affordable Housing Regarding the Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure §§ 1, 7.
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housing will be developed. The category in which the largest number of
housing units have been created under the Appeals Procedure has not
consisted of deed-restricted or government-funded units, but rather of
multifamily market-rate units produced as part of set-aside developments.
These units are frequently less expensive than the housing that was
previously available in the community in which they were built.' 18 The
2000 amendments fail because they ignore the importance of these units
and because they effect changes that are likely to decrease production by
private developers under the Appeals Procedure.
Two features of the amendments in particular have the potential to slow
considerably the rate of development under the Appeals Procedure. The
first is that the amendments tighten the requirements for deed-restricted
units in set-aside developments. This is likely to reduce substantially the
number of housing units that private developers create under the statute.
The second feature is the failure of the amendments to define whether the
"need" referred to by section 8-30g(c) is local, regional, or statewide. If, as
seems likely, the courts continue to interpret "need" as "local need," then
this will give wealthy towns the power to slow all development under the
statute by claiming that their local need is insubstantial.
A. More Stringent Requirements for Set-Aside Developments
The increased requirements for set-aside developments place a
significant burden on private developers. It is intuitive that raising the
minimum percentage of deed-restricted units from twenty-five percent to
thirty percent and increasing the number of units that must meet the low-
income affordability criteria (based on sixty percent of median income)
from ten percent to fifteen percent will decrease or erase developers' profits
and diminish incentives for private developers under the Appeals
Procedure. The surprising thing is that developers, "19 town planners,120 and
Blue Ribbon Commission members all acknowledge that increasing these
requirements is likely to decrease private development under the Appeals
118. Ethier et al., supra note 43, at 2; see also Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister,
supra note 80 (stating his observation that the market-rate units in multifamily developments
created under the statute are usually less expensive than the available housing in the host town).
119. Eleanor Charles, State Expected To Change Affordable Housing Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2000, at 11 ("'By agreeing with low-income housing proponents and creating more onerous
income restrictions, the [Blue Ribbon] [C]ommission has produced a chilling effect on the private
sector,' said Samuel Fuller, regional vice president of AvalonBay Communities, builders of
luxury rental complexes.").
120. Id. at 9 (quoting Diane Fox, the Greenwich town planner, who stated: "The increase in
units,. . . and the increase from 30 to 50 years during which affordable units must remain so may
give more teeth to the municipalities."); Telephone Interview with Mark Pellegrini, Town Planner,
Manchester, Conn. (Nov. 15, 2000) ("My personal opinion on these latest changes is that they set
the bar so high that developers will not even mess around with the procedure.").
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Procedure substantially. Some even say that the purpose of the amendments
was to prevent private development under the statute. 1
21
Mark Forlenza, a regional Vice President of the national real estate
development company AvalonBay Communities, testified before the
General Assembly's Select Committee on Housing that under the new
requirements, it would have been financially infeasible for his company
to develop Avalon Hills, its 168-unit apartment complex in Orange,
Connecticut. "What the new legislation would do would require us to pay
$600,000 less for the land to make this an economically viable
development," said Forlenza. 122 Forlenza told me that because the
amendments shift five percent of the units in a development from the
market-rate category to the low-income category (based on sixty percent of
median income), it will be very difficult for private developers to build any
developments in southern Connecticut under the Appeals Procedure. 123
Timothy Hollister, a Hartford land use attorney who was a member of
the Blue Ribbon Commission, agreed that for some communities, the
heightened requirements for set-aside units would "effectively restrict[]
private developers from bringing these appeals." 124
Several participants have described the amendments as the result of a
coalition formed between nonprofit organizations and exclusionary
suburban towns, which was designed to decrease the amount of private
development under the Appeals Procedure. 125 Forlenza called the
amendments "an interesting compromise between two seemingly opposite
parties."'126 Towns are happy with the decrease in the threat from private
developers, and nonprofits now face less competition in the construction of
affordable housing. 127 "Towns don't want low-income housing at all, and
housing advocates want even deeper subsidies for low-income housing,"
said Gurdon Buck, a land use lawyer with the Hartford firm of Robinson &
Cole who testified before the Blue Ribbon Commission. 128 Larry Kluetsch,
the director of the nonprofit Mutual Housing Association of Southwestern
121. See infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
122. Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Hous., 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2000)
(statement of Mark Forlenza, Vice President, AvalonBay Communities).
123. Telephone Interview with Mark Forlenza, Vice President, AvalonBay Communities,
Wilton, Conn. (Dec. 7, 2000).
124. Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister, supra note 80. The Blue Ribbon
Commission Report also concedes that the increased set-aside requirements "may prove to be a
disincentive to private developers." BLUE RiBBON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
125. Telephone Interview with Gurdon Buck, Partner, Robinson & Cole, Hartford, Conn.
(Oct. 24, 2000).
126. Telephone Interview with Mark Forlenza, supra note 123.
127. Telephone Interview with Gurdon Buck, supra note 125.
128. Id.
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Connecticut, admitted that "for the nonprofit community, these changes are
good because we face less competition from private developers."'129
Buck said that he thought that the main objective of the amendments
was to make deed-restricted units as difficult to sell as possible. 130
Manchester's Town Planner, Mark Pelligrini, echoed this, saying that the
latest changes to the requirements for set-aside developments "set[] the bar
so high that developers will not even mess around with the procedure."' 131
When I asked him whether he thought this was intentional, he replied, "No
one will tell you that. I think that on a political level a compromise was
achieved. But on an economic level .... the new law is a stopper."'] 32
While this compromise may suit exclusionary towns and nonprofit
developers, it is unlikely to benefit low- and moderate-income housing
consumers. Nonprofits are unlikely to be able to make up the decrease in
the number of affordable units produced in connection with private set-
aside developments. Blue Ribbon Commission member Timothy Hollister
said that he does not "expect that nonprofit developers will step into the
breach and make up the difference" in the decreased production from for-
profit developers. 133 Hollister noted that nonprofits have never brought a
significant number of the appeals under the statute and that the amendments
give them no new incentives to do so. 13 4 . Perhaps more importantly, the
amendments are also likely to sacrifice an even greater number of medium-
and high-density multifamily market-rate units that have been produced
under the statute in connection with set-aside developments.
B. Need: Local, Regional, or Statewide?
The second potential pitfall in the 2000 amendments is the failure to
define the term "need" after the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in
Christian Activities Council that the term referred to "local need" for the
purposes of the Appeals Procedure. 135 The legislature chose not to take the
Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendation that it redefine the "need"
referred to in section 8-30g(c) as "regional need." Legislators paid little
attention to the potential effects of this omission in the debates, but it is
likely to slow the pace of housing development under the Appeals
Procedure significantly.
129. Telephone Interview with Larry Kluetsch, Executive Director, Mutual Housing
Association of Southwestern Connecticut (Dec. 1, 2000).
130. Telephone Interview with Gurdon Buck, supra note 125.
131. Telephone Interview with Mark Pellegrini, supra note 120.
132. Id.
133. Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister, supra note 80.
134. Id.
135. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231, 249
(Conn. 1999).
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The question of whether the "need" for affordable housing that a local
zoning commission is to balance against its reasons for denying an
affordable housing application is "local need" or some broader regional or
statewide need was a central issue in Christian Activities Council. The
Town of Glastonbury argued that the need should be defined locally, and
that under that standard, its own need would be minimal. Examining the
statute's legislative history, the court agreed, holding that need should be
defined as "local need" for the purposes of section 8-30g. 136 This ruling
substantially narrowed the standard of review that the lower courts had
been applying.
137
The Blue Ribbon Commission recommended that the legislature
reverse the court's position by inserting the word "regional" before "need"
in section 8-30g(c), but the House of Representatives declined to do so on
the ground that "the word regional could be misinterpreted to imply that a
suburban town has no duty to meet regional housing needs if a nearby
center city has a substantial amount of low income housing."'
138
The legislature's solution was to punt the issue to the courts. "By
deleting the word," explained Representative Flaherty, "the amendment
leaves to judicial construction what constitutes housing need.",1 39 Flaherty
added that he expected that "housing need will be interpreted by the
courts in a manner consistent with the zoning enabling act."14 0 The
zoning enabling act states that a municipality's zoning "regulations
shall.., encourage the development of housing opportunities, ... for all
residents of the municipality and the planning region in which the
municipality is located."14 1 According to Hollister, proponents of the
regional interpretation are relying on this language in section 8-2 to
convince the courts that the "need" referred to by section 8-30g(c) is not
strictly local. 1
42
Letting the courts determine the scope of the "need inquiry," however,
is a risky strategy for regionalists, since the Connecticut Supreme Court has
already ruled that the statute defines need locally. 14 3 It seems highly
unlikely that the court will reverse that interpretation given that the
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; see also Tondro, supra note 33, at 1143
("In Christian Activities Council v. Town Council of Glastonbury, the court watered-down a
town's obligation to support affordable housing to the level it existed prior to the adoption of the
Act ... ").
138. House Debate, supra note 108 (statement of Rep. Flaherty).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
142. Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister, supra note 80.
143. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231, 249
(Conn. 1999).
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legislature considered changing the wording of the statute to "regional
need," but decided against it.
The effect of determining need locally is to reinforce the behavior
of exclusionary municipalities. If a town has engaged in successful
exclusionary strategies in the past, so that only affluent people are living in
the town, then by definition the town has little or no need for affordable
housing. Faced with a low level of need, a local land use commission can
recite almost any legally permissible reason for turning down an affordable
housing application and find that it "clearly outweighs" the town's need for
affordable housing.
V. WHY DEED-RESTRICTED UNITS ARE NOT THE SOLUTION
The 2000 amendments are likely to result in the production of fewer
multifamily market-rate units and probably fewer deed-restricted affordable
units in Connecticut. Even if they were to increase the number of deed-
restricted affordable units significantly, however, there are substantial
problems with the transfer and administration of deed-restricted units that
preclude the deed-restriction device from providing a good long-term
solution to the state's need for moderate-income housing.
A. Inclusionary Zoning in Connecticut
Connecticut has had more than a decade of experience with deed-
restricted affordable housing units. The legislature began to encourage the
production of deed-restricted units in 1988 by enacting a statute that allows
municipalities to promulgate "inclusionary zoning" regulations, which
provide exemptions from regular density limits when a developer agrees to
produce deed-restricted affordable housing. 144
These local inclusionary zoning programs produced a variety of deed-
restricted units that are subject to different requirements.145 I attempted to
144. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2g (2001).
145. Municipal inclusionary zoning regulations vary widely. Some towns provide density
bonuses (although they do not guarantee project approval) for deed-restricted units with less
stringent restrictions than those required in the Appeals Procedure. E.g., Town of Fairfield,
Regulations for Designed Residence District § 10.6.9 (providing a fifty-percent density bonus for
developments in which not less than twenty percent of the total number of units will be affordable
at eighty percent of the median income for at least twenty-five years after initial occupancy);
Town of Glastonbury, Planned Area Development Zone Pad § 4.12.3 (1989) (providing a variable
density bonus that increases as the percentage of deed-restricted units increases, with twenty
percent as the minimum percentage of restricted units); Town of Newtown, Zoning Regulations
§§ 4.22.411, 4.22.414 (1994) (applying a formula similar to Fairfield's, but requiring that deed-
restrictions remain in place for at least twenty years after initial occupancy).
Wilton has inclusionary zoning regulations that are stricter than section 8-30g. The town
requires that 100% of the units in an affordable housing zone be deed-restricted. Town of Wilton,
Zoning Regulations §§ 29-5.A(7)(a)(3), .B(9)(c)(1) (2000). It is unclear, however, whether this
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contact all of the towns that were listed by the DECD as having deed-
restricted units that qualify under section 8-30g in order to learn about their
experiences with administering these units. 
146
B. Problems with Deed-Restricted Units
My discussions with town planning and zoning officials and land use
attorneys revealed three main problems with limiting resale prices through
the use of restrictive covenants. First, potential buyers of deed-restricted
units have experienced problems with getting mortgages on these
properties. Second, it is difficult for municipalities to monitor and enforce
the maximum price and income restrictions attached to deed-restricted
properties. Third, because resale prices for deed-restricted units fluctuate
not only with the median income of the region or state, but also with
interest rates, rising interest rates could cause a moderate-income
homeowner to lose significant equity if forced to sell his or her home.
1. Mortgage Financing
Town planners told me that some moderate- and low-income buyers
have experienced difficulties getting mortgages to finance the purchase of
deed-restricted properties. 147 Mortgage lenders may be reluctant to make
loans based on these deed-restricted properties for several reasons. First,
mortgage lenders often require buyers to purchase mortgage insurance
when buyers make less than a twenty-percent down payment on the
property. 148 The new amendments to the Appeals Procedure impose
maximum allowable down payments on the deed-restricted units. 14 9 The
problem arises because mortgage insurers will not insure properties that are
subject to maximum resale price restrictions. 150 This problem may be partly
solved because lenders are able to get credit under the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) if they make loans on these affordable
requirement is actually legally meaningful, since towns may not turn down affordable housing
applications solely because they do not comply with the town's underlying affordable housing
regulations, as long as they comply with section 8-30g. Town Close Assocs. v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 679 A.2d 378, 381 n.8 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
146. For a list of the towns contacted in the telephone survey, see supra note 83.
147. Telephone Interview with Jeff Ollendorf, Planner, Farmington, Conn. (Oct. 25, 2000)
(stating that there "was some trouble getting mortgages, particularly from those [lenders] who
want to sell [their mortgages] on the secondary market"); Telephone Interview with Richard Pfurr,
Planner, Cheshire, Conn. (Oct. 26, 2000) (stating that "people had trouble getting mortgages on
these properties").
148. Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister, supra note 80.
149. An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission To Study
Affordable Housing Regarding the Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure § l(b)(2)(A), 2000
Conn. Acts 206 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2001)).
150. Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister, supra note 80.
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properties. 151 However, given the experiences of some Connecticut towns,
the CRA may not provide a complete solution. 152
A second potential problem for mortgage lenders is that it is unclear
whether they can foreclose on deed-restricted properties. According to
Buck, "by requiring that the purchaser be one of the target classes, you
exclude the possibility of the lender foreclosing-there is no security."' 153
The Appeals Procedure is silent on the issue of whether a lender may
foreclose on deed-restricted properties. The Town of Madison deals with
this issue in its inclusionary zoning regulations by terminating the covenant
restricting resale price in the event that a lender forecloses. Madison's
regulations provide that "title restrictions ... will automatically terminate
if... [t]he title to the mortgage is transferred by foreclosure or deed-in-lieu
of foreclosure" to a federally insured lending institution. 154 This rule takes
care of the problem of lender uncertainty, but the cost of a rule like this is
that it removes the price restrictions from the property, which the lender
could then resell at market rates. From a town's perspective, it would also
have the drawback of removing the unit from being counted toward an
exemption or a moratorium from section 8-30g.
There is no similar rule in section 8-30g or under most local
inclusionary zoning regulations, and it is not entirely clear what happens to
deed-restricted properties when a lender forecloses. Timothy Hollister, a
member of the Blue Ribbon Commission, said that banks could foreclose
on the properties, but would have to sell them to buyers with incomes low
enough to qualify under the Appeals Procedure. 155 This would make the
properties unattractive collateral from a bank's perspective. Mike Santoro,
of the Connecticut Department of Economic Development, said that lenders
are generally required to get a court to remove a restrictive covenant when
foreclosing on a deed-restricted property. According to Santoro, this would
also disqualify the units from counting toward a town's moratorium under
section 8-30g.156
151. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994). The CRA requires federal banking regulators to
"encourage ... [financial] institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions." Id.
The CRA provides that regulators should evaluate an institution's performance under the statute
and take it into account when licensing the expansion of regulated institutions. § 2903(a)(2).
152. Telephone Interview with Jeff Ollendorf, supra note 147; Telephone Interview with
Richard Pfurr, supra note 147.
153. Telephone Interview with Gurdon Buck, supra note 125.
154. Town of Madison, Affordable Housing District Regulations § 26.3(4) (1994).
155. Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister, supra note 80.
156. Telephone Interview with Mike Santoro, Department of Economic and Community
Development, Hartford, Conn. (Oct. 26, 2000).
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2. Monitoring Price and Income Limits
A second reason why deed-restricted units are an impractical long-term
solution to the shortage of moderate-income housing is that they are
difficult for municipalities to monitor and administer fairly and accurately.
Until 1996, the state did not require any verification that deed-restricted
units were being rented or sold at restricted prices to renters or buyers with
incomes that were low enough to qualify under the statute. Since 1996,
section 8-30h has required landlords who are renting deed-restricted
affordable units to file yearly certifications that their rent levels and renters'
incomes comply with the restrictions. 157 There is no such certification
process for for-sale units, however. Towns are responsible for making sure
that their price remains below what the deed restrictions specify, and for
monitoring how people are chosen to purchase the below-market units.
While some towns' inclusionary zoning regulations provide that
developers must file plans that detail how the deed-restricted properties will
be sold and resold so that they may remain qualified as deed-restricted units
under the Act, 158 most of the town officials with whom I spoke were not
aware of how, if at all, their town monitors the transfer of these deed-
restricted units.
In some towns, municipal officials are responsible for approving the
transfer of deed-restricted units. 159 Other towns delegate responsibility for
monitoring these units to local nonprofit organizations. 160 Others rely on
the condominium associations in which the deed-restricted properties are
located. 16 1 Most towns, however, are not involved in monitoring the
transactions at all, and rely on the individual owners to make sure that they
are reselling the units at prices and to buyers consistent with the deed
restrictions. 16
2
157. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30h (2001).
158. Inclusionary zoning regulations in some towns require developers to form a contract
with the town specifying how the deed-restricted properties will be administered. Town of
Farmington, Affordable Housing Zone Regulations § 25(D); Town of Newtown, Zoning
Regulations § 4.22.200(4) (1994).
159. Telephone Interview with Ken Leslie, supra note 88 (stating that the local housing
authority does a sale-price review when deed-restricted properties come up for sale); Telephone
Interview with Jeff Ollendorf, supra note 147 (same).
160. Telephone Interview with John Bossi, Town Engineer, Plainville, Conn. (Nov. 15, 2000)
(stating that the town delegates the responsibility of administering deed-restricted units to a local
nonprofit organization); Telephone Interview with Mark Pellegrini, supra note 120 (same);
Telephone Interview with Don Poland, Town Planner, East Windsor, Conn. (Nov. 21, 2000)
(same).
161. Telephone Interview with John Bossi, supra note 160.
162. Telephone Interview with Don Foster, supra note 88 (stating that West Hartford relies
on self-monitoring to maintain the conditions on deed-restricted properties); Telephone Interview
with Elizabeth Stocker, supra note 86 (same).
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The 2000 amendments to the Appeals Procedure attempt to give towns
greater powers to enforce the price and resident restrictions on deed-
restricted units. The amended statute requires proponents of affordable
housing developments to submit a plan designating those who will be
responsible for monitoring the deed-restricted units. 163 As long as towns
receive credit toward the exemption and moratorium simply by sending
copies of the restricted deeds to the state, without having to demonstrate
compliance,1 64 however, there is little incentive for towns to spend
resources on monitoring. Therefore, there is no information about whether
the deed-restricted units actually remain affordable. Even if the towns were
equipped to monitor the initial sale and subsequent transfer of deed-
restricted units, it is unclear that it would be worth the cost, given the
alternative of relying on denser development of multifamily market-rate
units to fill the need for moderate-income housing.
3. Interest Rate Fluctuation
A third general problem with deed-restricted properties arises because
the maximum sale price for these units is inversely related to the prevailing
interest rate for mortgages. Maximum resale prices are calculated under the
statute by taking, for example, sixty percent of the state median income and
determining how much a buyer earning that amount could pay toward
mortgage payments so that the yearly payments would not exceed thirty
percent of his or her income. 16 5 Thus, the lower the prevailing interest rate
for mortgages, the greater the maximum allowable price. The problem
arises when a buyer buys during a time when mortgage interest rates are
low and then must sell when interest rates go up. In this case, a buyer would
lose a significant amount of the equity in his or her home.
The price restriction in general, and this risk posed by rising interest
rates in particular, go against the longstanding policy of using
homeownership as a tool to develop savings. 166 This additional risk may
also increase the difficulty of getting mortgages on deed-restricted
properties. 167
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(b)(1) (2001).
164. Mike Santoro, the official in the Department of Economic and Community Development
responsible for overseeing the exemption calculation, said that towns get credit toward the ten-
percent exemption from section 8-30g by sending the DECD copies of deeds containing
restrictions that comply with the requirements of the Act. Telephone Interview with Mike Santoro,
supra note 156.
165. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(a)(6) (2001); see also Understanding the Amendments to
Connecticut's Affordable Housing Act, Sept. 8, 2000, available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/hsg/
830gConference.htm (providing a sample calculation).
166. Thomas Scheffey, A Housing Bill To Live With, CONN. L. TRIB., May 15, 2000.
167. Telephone Interview with Gurdon Buck, supra note 125.
1278 [Vol. 110: 1247
Connecticut Retrenches
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE
Most of the housing units produced under the Appeals Procedure have
been market-rate units built by private developers in connection with set-
aside developments. 168 These market-rate units are frequently built at a
higher density than would have been allowed if the builder had not invoked
the Appeals Procedure. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the market-rate
units produced under the statute have frequently provided housing at lower
prices than were previously available in the host municipality. 1
69
Deed-restricted units can present significant problems. These include
difficulty with getting mortgages on deed-restricted properties, high
administrative costs, and uncertainty about whether the properties remain in
the hands of qualifying tenants and owners. By increasing the number of
deed-restricted units required in set-aside developments, the 2000
amendments to the Appeals Procedure threaten to slow considerably the
rate of multifamily housing construction in Connecticut, while at the same
time potentially increasing the number of deed-restricted units built. The
outcomes of the last decade of experience with the Appeals Procedure and
the problems with deed-restricted units suggest that the 2000 amendments
to the statute move away from achieving the goal of creating more housing
units for low- and moderate-income families in Connecticut. A better
solution to Connecticut's affordable housing shortage would be for the
legislature to scrap the system of creating deed-restricted set-aside units in
favor of a builder's remedy that would be triggered by proposals to build
multifamily developments above a certain density.
A. Will Higher-Density Multifamily Housing Be Cheaper?
To know whether such a proposal makes sense, a threshold question
must be resolved: whether an increase in the construction of multifamily
housing built at higher densities than would be otherwise allowable is likely
to lead to a decrease in housing costs. The 1997 study observed that the
market-rate units produced under the Appeals Procedure have tended to
cost less than other units in the surrounding town. 170 Other factors also
suggest that increasing the density of development and encouraging the
production of multifamily housing could lower housing costs.
168. See supra Section H.D.
169. Ethier et al., supra note 43, at 2; see also Telephone Interview with Timothy Hollister,
supra note 80 (observing that the market-rate units built under the statute are often less expensive
than the housing that was already available in the host town).
170. Ethier et al., supra note 43, at 2.
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1. Economies from Using Less Land and Grouping Housing Units
While the price of land typically increases as it is zoned for higher-
density uses, 17 1 developers can experience significant cost savings from
using less acreage per housing unit. Additionally, medium- and high-
density multifamily housing is cheaper to build than large-lot single-family
housing because of technical economies that arise in the housing
construction process. These economies result from the developers' ability to
build fewer streets and to use common connections to utilities such as
sewers, drainage, water, gas, and electricity. 17 2 One study estimated that
these savings could range from around twenty-five percent in the case of
simply clustering single-family housing to sixty-seven percent in the case
of medium-density low-rise apartment buildings. 173 In the case of a
competitive housing market, the bulk of these savings would be passed
along to the buyers of the housing units.
2. Increased Supply/Filtering Effects
Increasing the permissible density of housing construction is also likely
to increase the supply of housing in a given municipality. This is significant
because, other things being equal, it will decrease the average price of
housing. The theory of filtering is a corollary to the idea that an increase in
the supply of housing will decrease average housing prices. This theory
argues that production of any housing units will eventually benefit
households that consume the bottom range of housing. As new housing is
produced, consumers of higher-end housing will move out of their old
homes and into new units. This transaction will continue as people "trade
up," eventually benefiting the households at the bottom of the income
range. 174 While there is empirical evidence that suggests that filtering does
take place in some housing markets, 175 the theory has been widely
171. E.g., Crone, supra note 47, at 170. If this were not true, then the builder's remedy that
the set-aside provisions rely on would be unlikely to produce any units. The developers bring suits
under the Appeals Procedure because they are compensated by the increased density at which they
can develop the land.
172. Dietderich, supra note 23, at 51.
173. ALAN MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY ZONING HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND
PRACTICES 60 (1984).
174. E.g., Ellickson, supra note 21, at 1185 ("As time passes, any individual housing .unit
tends to filter downward in relative quality as its components depreciate, and as its layout and
equipment become obsolete.").
175. E.g., JOHN C. WEICHER, HOUSING: FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 25-26 (1980);
Brian J.L. Berry, Ghetto Expansion and Single-Family Housing Prices: Chicago, 1968-1972, 3 J.
URB. ECON. 397, 416-17 (1976) (finding that the construction of new housing in Chicago suburbs
decreased the price of housing in the inner city); John C. Weicher & Thomas G. Thibodeau,
Filtering and Housing Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 23 J. URB. ECON. 21, 37 (1988)
(concluding that "[fliltering does occur in housing markets, and it is important quantitatively").
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criticized. 176 One ground on which commentators have criticized filtering
theory is that the production of luxury housing is too far removed from
consumers of low- and moderate-income housing to have any practical
effect on them. 177 In the case of the production of high-density multifamily
housing, however, this might prove less of a criticism, since the trickle-
down effect described by filtering theory would have less distance to go in
order to affect low- and moderate-income households.
178
B. The Multifamily Housing Appeals Procedure
Here I outline what the Appeals Procedure would look like if it were
triggered by proposals for medium- to high-density multifamily housing
developments instead of set-aside developments. I am not suggesting that
multifamily market-rate units can serve the housing consumers at the lowest
end of the economic spectrum. It may be that public funding is the only
way to house the very poor. Therefore, these changes should apply only to
the part of the statute that deals with proposals for set-aside developments
and would leave intact the portion dealing with proposals for public
housing projects.179
176. E.g., ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 33 ("Substantial disagreement surrounds
the notion of filtering in the housing literature."); Dietderich, supra note 23, at 45.
177. E.g., ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 519; Dietderich, supra note 23, at 44-45.
Professor Jerome Rothenberg and his co-authors developed a theory of urban housing markets that
assumes that housing units are segmented into different submarkets. They defined those
submarkets as collections "of all dwellings in a metropolitan area whose... attributes... are
evaluated as a whole by demanders and suppliers as closely equivalent." ROTHENBERG ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 1. Their study concluded that "encouraging filtering by subsidizing high-quality
new construction is a comparatively inefficient way to aid lower-income households." Id. at 320.
178. The Rothenberg study stated that one of the main sources of its skepticism about the
benefits of filtering was that the "repercussions [of new housing construction] dampen
progressively the further in quality one moves from the submarket bearing the initial impact."
ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 320. The higher-density multifamily housing that this
Note proposes would be likely to fall into a middle-quality submarket, and therefore would be
much more likely to have an impact on the supply of low-income housing than the high-end
construction that is typically assumed in discussions of filtering theory. See id. at 519 (noting that
the study's critique that the construction of high-end housing has little effect on the bottom two
quintiles of the housing market "would not apply to construction originating in middle-quality
submarkets").
179. This proposal to allow higher-density development of multifamily housing units in
towns that lack them would not implicate the problems with high-density development that
Professors Schill and Wachter and others have identified in dense public housing projects. E.g.,
Schill & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1289-95. The proposal in this Note would probably not
decrease housing unit prices enough to affect the state's poorest residents. Its main benefit would
be to provide housing for moderate-income families in suburban towns where it was not
previously available. Therefore, it would not create a concentration of extreme poverty of the kind
that Schill and Wachter criticize. Instead, it would be likely to foster socioeconomic and racial
integration at the level of the municipality. See Boudreaux, supra note 25, at 556-63 (arguing that
because racial minority status is highly correlated with apartment living, permitting the
construction of high-density multifamily apartments in the suburbs would promote racial
integration).
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1. Exemption and Moratorium
First, it is necessary to eliminate the moratorium that the 2000
amendments introduce. It has the virtue of recognizing the significance of
new market-rate units, but it does more harm than good by prioritizing the
production of government-funded and deed-restricted units above all other
forms of construction. The system that exempts towns in which more than
ten percent of the housing stock qualifies as "affordable" should be
preserved because it exempts municipalities that already have significant
amounts of public housing, multifamily housing, and low-cost rental
housing, thereby promoting the fair distribution of such housing and
decreasing the tendency for it to become concentrated in a few urban areas.
2. Proposals a Developer May Appeal: The Prima Facie Case
In order to take advantage of the potential economies created by denser
multifamily housing and to decrease the problems associated with price
restrictions, the statute should be amended to allow developers to appeal
denials of proposals for multifamily housing developments above a certain
density. The legislature could set a particular density per acre above which
developers could bring appeals. Connecticut could adopt a single minimum
density measure or, alternatively, the state could establish a sliding scale of
densities that would trigger the appeals process that varied based on the size
of the municipality. In addition to meeting the minimum density required to
trigger the procedure, developers would also have to submit a plan
indicating that they proposed to build the housing as multifamily housing
with, for example, at least four units per building.
3. A Municipality's Motion To Dismiss
If the developer met all of the technical requirements to appeal the
decision, the municipality would have a chance to have the appeal
dismissed if it could demonstrate that (1) the municipality contained a
significant amount of multifamily housing (at least five percent of its
housing stock); and (2) at least ten percent of its housing stock (including
market-rate units) met the price limits for affordability for people making
eighty percent of the state or regional median income (whichever is lower)
as defined in the statute. This would be a preliminary determination made
before a court got to the merits of the appeal. This would address the
concerns expressed by municipal officials that they are not getting credit for
their market-rate units that meet the state's affordability requirements. 180
180. See supra Subsection Iv.A.1.
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This inquiry could add significant costs to the procedure, because it
would require the court to examine evidence outside of the record compiled
by the local land use authority. It would, however, be an optional defense
that the municipality could raise at its discretion. Therefore, because of the
stringent standard, many towns would presumably choose not to raise the
issue, since they would bear the risk of nonpersuasion.
4. Weighing the Merits: Technical Feasibility, Reasonable Changes
If the court's inquiry were to proceed beyond the stage of the motion to
dismiss, then the current determination of whether a municipality's
articulated "substantial public interests" "clearly outweigh the need for
affordable housing" 18 1 should be replaced with a determination of whether
the project is technically feasible at reasonable cost. The feasibility standard
could be measured by estimating the engineering, materials, and labor costs
that it would take to make the project sound. For example, if a zoning board
said that the proposed development would create a sewage disposal
problem, then the court would estimate the cost of improving the town's
sewage disposal system to the point at which it could handle the
development. If a development was technically feasible at reasonable
implementation costs, then the town would be required to approve the
development.
This system would have the benefit of removing the issue of the
amount of a community's need for affordable housing, thereby also
removing the confusion over whether need should be defined locally or
more broadly. Under this proposal, if a community did not meet the
exemption from the Act and was unable to meet the standard for a motion
to dismiss, then the community would presumptively need to contribute to
the state's stock of moderate-income housing by allowing the production of
high-density multifamily housing.
In addition, similar to the standard under the current Appeals
Procedure, if the zoning board had plan-specific objections that could be
cured through reasonable changes, then the board would be under an
obligation to approve the development subject to those changes. The
reasonableness of the plan-specific changes would be judged according to
the likely cost increases they would impose on the development project.
C. Merits and Drawbacks
The primary merit of this system is that it would increase the
production of medium- and high-density multifamily housing in those
181. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(g) (2001).
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communities that lacked it, resulting in a likely decrease in average housing
prices in those communities. At the very least, it would provide a greater
variety of types of housing in Connecticut's exclusionary municipalities. It
would provide a concrete way of enforcing the instruction in the state's
zoning enabling act that municipal zoning "regulations shall... encourage
the development of housing opportunities, including opportunities for
multifamily dwellings .... for all residents of the municipality."1 82
This proposal would not require that the land in any specific
municipality be developed at high densities. It would simply remove towns'
restrictions that preclude the possibility of constructing housing at high
densities. Thus, one would expect developers to bring these appeals only
when the value in the land would increase when it is rezoned to allow
denser uses.
In addition to a potential decrease in housing prices, there are other
potential benefits to denser development that have been documented in the
literature on sprawl. This denser development could help to combat the
environmental and infrastructural problems associated with low-density
sprawl development. 183
The primary drawback to this proposal is a political one. The proposal
would face fierce opposition from the municipalities to which it would
apply. These are the same municipalities that drove the passage of the 2000
amendments. The opposition would be muted somewhat by towns' ability
to get credit for their low-priced market-rate units under this proposal. That
alone, however, would probably not create sufficient support for such an
initiative.
The problem with any legislative solution to exclusionary zoning is that
the more effective a solution promises to be, the more opposition it will
receive from exclusionary suburban towns. Some have cited this as a
modern-day example of the danger of majoritarian "faction" in small
democratic units that Madison warned of in The Federalist No. 10.184 This
is not to say that there are no good reasons to vest land use controls in local
authorities. For example, Professor Carol Rose suggests that the reason why
we assign decisions regarding land use and education to local units is
because "we are not willing to make [these] decisions ... through coalition
182. Id. § 8-2(a) (emphasis added).
183. E.g., William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 69-75 (1999); Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban
Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 876-78 (2000).
184. E.g., Stephen David Galowitz, Interstate Metro-Regional Responses to Exclusionary
Zoning, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 71 (1992); Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local
Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (1985). Promoting the idea of a national
government, Madison argued that majorities are likely to trample the rights of minority groups in
small governmental units: "[T]here is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker
party or an obnoxious individual." THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1999).
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building, but rather we want particularized consideration of individual
proposals by people whose judgment we trust and whom we can influence
through consultation." 185 This desire for local control may be particularly
strong in Connecticut, where there is a strong perception of the historical
power of municipal home rule. 186 Whatever the merits of local control of
land use decisions or the desire of municipalities to exercise that control,
Connecticut and several other states have chosen to reclaim some of that
control and return it to the state. Effectively combating exclusionary zoning
seems to require a willingness to do so.
One way to make the proposal for a multifamily housing appeals
procedure more politically palatable is to attack the fiscal concerns
underlying the towns' exclusionary behavior. 187 Studies have suggested
that a central concern of many exclusionary communities is with the fiscal
effects that new development will have on their school system. 188 The state
might be able to address this concern by compensating towns for the first
several years' worth of additional school district expenses incurred as a
result of additional schoolchildren in new multifamily developments.
189
VII. CONCLUSION
The 2000 amendments to the Appeals Procedure move Connecticut
away from the goal of meeting its needs for low- and moderate-income
housing. By increasing the requirements for set-aside developments and
failing to clarify the meaning of "need" in the statute after Christian
Activities Council, the amendments promise to reduce the amount of
housing units that private developers will construct under the Appeals
Procedure.
Private for-profit developers have produced by far the most housing
units under the Appeals Procedure. They have surpassed nonprofit and
185. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 911 (1983).
186. Timothy S. Hollister, The Myth and Reality of Home Rule Powers in Connecticut,
59 CONN. B.J. 389, 389-97 (1985) (noting that there is a strong perception of the powers of
municipal home rule in Connecticut, but that the state constitution actually devolves to
municipalities powers that are much more limited than is widely believed).
187. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal
Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1658-89 (1979) (arguing that the forces that give rise to
exclusionary zoning are largely fiscally motivated).
188. E.g., PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 164-66 (1995).
189. Connecticut has also shown a greater willingness than many states to entertain suits for
the equalization of school financing based on the state constitution's guarantees of public
education and equal protection. E.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977). To the degree that these suits are successful over the long
term in regionalizing school financing, they could have the effect of dampening municipalities'
fiscal incentives to engage in exclusionary zoning.
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public-sector developers in their production of both deed-restricted units
and market-rate units. Notably, there is evidence that even the market-rate
units that for-profit developers have built under the statute have often been
less expensive than the housing that was previously available in the
communities in which they are situated. This suggests that when developers
are allowed to build multifamily housing units at reasonably high densities
(as they frequently are in the context of set-aside developments), the result
will often be cheaper housing. The amendments fail because they are likely
to chill the activities of private developers substantially, reducing their
production of both deed-restricted and market-rate units.
It is unlikely that nonprofits or public-sector developers will be able to
make up this shortfall in the production of affordable housing units. Even if
they were able to make up the difference by stepping up the production of
deed-restricted units, these devices cannot provide a workable long-term
solution to Connecticut's affordable housing needs. Municipalities have
experienced significant problems with deed-restricted units during the last
decade. These problems include: (1) that it is difficult for low- and
moderate-income home buyers to get mortgage financing for deed-
restricted units; (2) that it is difficult for state and local officials to monitor
the price and income limits on deed-restricted units and their occupants;
and (3) that deed restrictions may cause low- and moderate-income
homeowners to lose equity in their homes due to interest rate fluctuations.
The state's experiences suggest that inclusionary zoning devices that rely
on deed restrictions are the wrong policy tools for Connecticut and other
states experimenting with ways to increase the supply of low- and
moderate-income housing.
A better alternative for Connecticut would be to amend the Appeals
Procedure to allow developers to appeal proposals for multifamily market-
rate housing developments above a certain density. This would be likely to
reduce housing prices and would offer more housing options in the state's
exclusionary towns without having to create deed-restricted units.
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